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I. INTRODUCTION
The reawakening of America's environmental consciousness has
resulted in not only the creation of new environmental programs, but
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also the discovery and implementation of heretofore (largely) ignored
provisions of existing environmental regulatory schemes. The regu-
lated community has experienced one aspect of this phenomenon in
a newfound emphasis on enforcement of environmental protection
laws through the imposition of criminal sanctions. Enforcement of
such laws at both the state and federal levels via the use of criminal
sanctions has rapidly escalated in recent years. While many of the
nation's major environmental protection laws have been on the books
since the early 1970's, regulatory agencies, initially focusing on im-
plementation of the substantive requirements of those laws, ordinarily
sought criminal sanctions in only a few egregious cases. Newly created
regulators, and a newly regulated business community, generally tended
to concentrate their attention on the major rulemaking efforts ne-
cessitated by the creation of complex environmental statutes and on
the development of technology to achieve the substantial goals set by
the environmental protection legislation of the 1970's. The simulta-
neous development of implementing rules and regulations, and ju-
dicial review of those rules and regulations, also contributed in some
degree to the sparing use of existing authorized criminal sanctions.
As a result, relatively little attention was given to enforcement by the
use of criminal sanctions during the 1970's and early 1980's.
As an example, throughout the mid-1980's most efforts to im-
plement the Clean Water Act were directed at the development of
technology-forcing effluent guidelines, water quality standards, and
permitting regimens to implement a new and complex regulatory
scheme.' A similar evolution occurred under both the Clean Air Act
of 19772 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.1
Only in recent years has the regulated community had sufficient
time to gain a comprehensive understanding of the regulatory pro-
grams and its obligations thereunder, and to have acted to assure
compliance therewith. The public and the courts were largely tolerant
of the absence of criminal enforcement during the formative years
of the nation's environmental protection programs. Events of recent
1. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1988).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1988).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1988).
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years, coupled with the fact that regulatory schemes have matured,
have eroded the tolerance previously enjoyed by business. Frequent
news accounts of illegal dumpers, major oil spills, and other man-
made environmental disasters reflect the type of stimuli that the courts
and the public have received to create a heightened concern on en-
vironmental enforcement issues. Just as the business community
adapted to marketplace changes that have occurred in the last decade,
so too must it adapt to the changes that occurred in the enforcement
of the nation's environmental protection laws. Those changes include
the dramatic increase in the use of criminal sanctions against both
companies and individuals.4
Until recently, it was unusual, if not unthinkable, that the gov-
ernment would use criminal prosecution for any but the most ag-
gravated violations of environmental protection laws. The new
emphasis on criminal prosecution of individuals represents a major
4. The following 1989 and 1990 decisions are representative of the significant increase in crim-
inal fines and jail terms for violation of environmental protection laws and represent the broad spec-
trum of personnel at risk:
See Pozsgai v. United States, 897 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 48 (U.S.
1990) (defendant convicted on forty-one counts of illegally filling wetlands sentenced to 3 years im-
prisonment and fined $200,000); United States v. Tran, No. 90-333 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 1990) (supervisor
at federal contractor's laboratory pled guilty to 2 counts of falsifying toxicity test results concerning
Superfund sites, and, as a result, is facing ten year imprisonment and $500,000 fine); United States
v. Paccione, 738 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (two defendants convicted for operating illegal landfill
sentenced to twelve years imprisonment and ordered to pay $250,000 in fines); United States v. Davis
Pipe & Metal Fabricators, Inc., No. CR-2-89-51 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 27, 1990) (producer of stainless
steel pipe fined $400,000 after pleading guilty to dumping hazardous wastes in violation of RCRA);
United States v. Melle, No. C-89-142 CR (W.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 1990) (employee of industrial solvents
reclamation company sentenced to 12 months at correctional facility after pleading guilty to one count
of transporting hazardous waste to an unpermitted facility in violation of RCRA and CERCLA);
United States v. Bogas, 731 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (former airport commissioner sentenced
to 180 days home detention, ordered to perform 1000 hours of community service, and placed on
probation after pleading guilty to making false statement to EPA and failing to report release of
hazardous substance pursuant to CERCLA § 103(a)); United States v. Fisher R.P.M. Electronic Mo-
tors, Inc., No. 89-234 (D.C. Or. Feb. 8, 1990) (owner of company sentenced to 3 months in-house
custody, 3 years probation, and ordered to pay $2,500 fine based on negligent discharge of pollutants
in violation of Clean Water Act; United States v. Brittain, No. 89-283 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 1989)
(former public utility department supervisor sentenced to one year of imprisonment for falsifying
wastewater discharge monitoring reports; former water pollution control manager sentenced to four
months imprisonment and five years probation for making false statement and discharging raw sewage);
United States v. Marine Shale Processors, Inc., No. 89-60041 (W.D. La. July 24, 1989) (hazardous
waste handler fined $1,000,000 after pleading guilty to felony permit violation under RCRA and two
misdemeanor violations of Rivers and Harbors Act).
1991]
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departure from this historical approach. The government's motive for
this change in philosophy was described by a former Assistant At-
torney General in charge of the Land and Natural Resources Division
of the United States Department of Justice in an article published in
1987:
The government's increased resort to criminal enforcement of the environmental
laws has one principal, overarching goal: deterrence. The stigma that attaches to
a criminal conviction and the dislocation inherent in actual incarceration combine
to make the threat of criminal prosecution a major tool in obtaining greater com-
pliance with the nation's environmental laws. The Justice Department and EPA
strongly believe that members of the regulated community will be less likely to
consider wilful or calculated evasion of environmental standards when they know
that discovery may lead to a prison term.
It is no accident, therefore, that three times as many individuals have been pros-
ecuted by the environmental crime section as corporate defendants. Corporations
cannot go to prison, and they can readily pass the costs associated with a criminal
fine along to consumers. On the other hand, individuals acutely feel the personal
impact of imprisonment and a criminal record. This strategy and the philosophy
of deterrence are not unique to environmental cases, but rather govern the De-
partment of Justice's prosecutorial policy in all areas of criminal enforcement, in-
cluding white collar and traditional crimes.-
Politicians, U. S. Attorneys, state attorneys general, and local
prosecutors are keenly aware that prosecution of environmental crimes
gains favorable media attention and increased public support, par-
ticularly to a public imbued with a newfound respect for the envi-
ronment. Such public awareness creates a "win-win" situation for
the criminal prosecution of environmental violators. Instances of such
prosecution are therefore occurring with increasing frequency.
Criminal prosecutions for environmental violations are no longer
restricted to the most serious of crimes. At the same time, the con-
sequences of a conviction for environmental crimes have increased
dramatically with the issuance of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.6
The guidelines impose specific limitations on federal judges making
it more likely that a person convicted of an environmental felony
will serve jail time.
5. F. Henry Habicht II, "The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement:
How To Remain on the Civil Side," 17 ELR 10478, at 10480, December, 1987.
6. U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.1.
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Knowing that even companies with advanced environmental com-
pliance programs can unintentionally violate the myriad of compli-
cated environmental regulatory schemes which, in many instances, can
regulate virtually every aspect of business operations, the regulators
look for specific criteria to select a case for criminal prosecution.
Among the literature which discusses such criteria is the September
21, 1987 document entitled "Memorandum on Factors to Consider
in Determining Whether a Matter Should be Referred For Criminal
Investigation. ' ' 7 In the Memorandum, authored by the U. S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the EPA identifies six factors
as relevant to determining whether a matter should be referred for
criminal prosecution. The factors include:
1. Knowing or Willful Behavior - federal environmental protection statutes
and their state counterparts require some degree of intent or voluntariness to pros-
ecute for a criminal offense.
2. Elements of the Offense - it is necessary to prove each of the mandated
elements of environmental crime as specified by the underlying statutes.
3. Impact on the Government's Regulatory Function - because the EPA's
programs rely on voluntary reporting from the regulated community, the govern-
ment will target cases where there has been some effort to falsify, conceal or destroy
documents or information that the government believes to be critical to the integrity
of the regulatory system.
4. Environmental Harm - prosecutors may consider the duration, extent, or
threat of harm to the environment in determining whether to pursue criminal sanc-
tions. It is significant, however, that proof of harm is not a prerequisite to the
prosecution.
5. Patterns of Practice - past environmental compliance practices, good or
bad, can weigh heavily on the government's decision to exercise its prosecutorial
discretion to pursue criminal sanctions.
6. Deterrence - a central purpose of criminal prosecution under the nation's
environmental laws is to deter others from committing similar acts. This may cause
the government to pursue a high profile case over one that may gain fewer headlines.
Clearly, the certainty of increased enforcement of environmental
protection laws via criminal sanctions will assume that a regulated
community, already attuned to dealing with the complexities of the
various environmental regulatory programs, will become increasingly
sensitized to the importance of compliance. Everyone from executive
7. See EPA Memorandum, "Environmental Criminal Conduct Coming to the Attention of
Agency Officials and Employees," issued by Thomas L. Adams, Jr., Assistant Administrator, Office
of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring (September 21, 1987).
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management to hourly workers must have an adequate appreciation
of the import of the laws and of the consequences of enforcement
through criminal sanctions. Compliance audits, training programs,
and effectively communicated compliance policies are critical to
avoiding criminal sanctions.
II. PoTENTAL EFFECTS ON TIE COAL INDUSTRY
With the likelihood of more frequent use of criminal sanctions
for the enforcement of environmental laws, the coal industry must
realize that it will not be immune from potential exposure to the
threat of criminal enforcement. In fact, like other sectors of the reg-
ulated community, future regulation of coal industry practices will
certainly reflect the trend towards criminal sanctions for violations
of environmental law. The likelihood of criminal enforcement will
increase, not only under laws with which the coal industry is com-
monly familiar, such as the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977 and its state counterparts, but also under other envi-
ronmental laws with which the industry may not be so familiar. In
the sections which follow, the criminal provisions of relevant envi-
ronmental laws to the coal industry will be discussed.
A. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
As state regulators with limited resources attempt to heighten en-
forcement of the environmental protection standards contained in the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA),8
environmentalists and others are calling for a more systematic and
frequent use of criminal sanctions as a just and efficient means of
deterrence. 9 Indeed, many industry representatives believe that the use
of criminal penalty provisions contained in SMCRA should be en-
hanced. Presumably, a credible threat of criminal liability under
SMCRA would help control or eliminate unscrupulous operators, and
would obviate administrative schemes now employed to link those
8. 30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328 (1988) [hereinafter "SMCRA"].
9. For a general discussion of certain violations of the Act which are reported to be widespread,
many of which evince a criminal intent to violate the Act, see Galloway & FitzGerald, Abuse of the
Surface Mining Act: A Continuing Story, 87 W. VA. L. REv. 627 (1985).
[Vol. 93
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who own or control coal properties with violations left by inept or
unscrupulous operators. 0 As a result of this trend, coal operators
face an enhanced risk of criminal liability, including imprisonment,
for violations previously considered by some to result from excusable
ignorance. %
While the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 197711 is not
per se considered an environmental statute by practictioners, a re-
cently publicized $500,000 fine - reportedly the second-highest crim-
inal penalty ever assessed under that statute - illustrates the new
emphasis by federal enforcement agencies on investigating and pur-
suing criminal violations in the coal fields. In announcing that fine,
U.S. Attorney Michael Carey of the Southern District of West Vir-
ginia indicated that investigations of other coal operators were con-
tinuing and could include facilities and operations .located in other
jurisdictions. 12 This action signals increased criminal enforcement of
safety and health laws, under which prosecutions have been pursued
in appropriate cases for quite some time. 3 The routine consideration
of criminal sanctions for purely environmental violations, however,
adds a new dimension to the regulation of coal operations on both
the federal and state levels.' 4
Criminal penalties are authorized under SMCRA'5 for three dis-
tinct types of violations: (1) making false or misleading statements
10. See Means, The Applicant Violator System: A Critical Evaluation, 10 EAsT. Mni. L. INST.
§ 6.08 (1989).
11. 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1988).
12. The Charleston Gazette, January 18, 1991.
13. See, e.g., Ryan & Schell, Criminal Sanctions Under The Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act of 1977, 85 W. VA. L. Rnv. 757 (1983).
14. For example, on October 1, 1990 the West Virginia Division of Energy announced the
establishment of a new "Office of Environmental Enforcement" which will reportedly work closely
with the U.S. Attorney's office and the West Virginia Attorney General in prosecuting coal miners
who intentionally operate outside the law. The office was to be staffed with personnel with back-
grounds in criminal investigation and surveillance experience. The Charleston Gazette, October 1,
1990.
15. Like other environmental laws preceding it, SMCRA allows a state to become the primary
authority responsible for regulating coal mining and reclamation operations on non-federal lands within
its borders upon submission of a "state program" and approval of the same by the Secretary of the
Interior. 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (Supp. 1990). To obtain "primacy," a state's laws must be no less stringent
than and meet the minimum requirements of all applicable provisions of SMCRA. Further, a state's
regulations must be no less effective than the Secretary's regulations in meeting the requirements of
1991]'
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in any document filed with a regulatory authority or required to be
maintained by the Act;16 (2) willful and knowing violations of permit
conditions;17 and (3) failing or refusing to comply with orders issued
by the Secretary of the Interior or any reviewing court.' Given the
comprehensive nature of SMCRA's technical provisions, and the re-
gulations promulgated thereunder, the range of activities which could
result in a criminal prosecution under one or more of these categories
is quite broad.
1. False Statements
Section 518(g) of SMCRA provides that:
Whoever knowingly makes any false statement, representation, or certification,
or knowingly fails to make any statement, representation, or certification in any
application, record, report, plant [sic], or other document filed or required to be
maintained ... shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than
$10,000, or by imprisonment for not more than one year or both. 9
Thus, a person can be held liable under SMCRA not only for
direct falsehoods, but for failing to make any statement which should
be made in any fied or required document. There are numerous
components of SMCRA and the regulations in which affirmative
statements and certifications are required, any of which could pre-
cipitate an investigation if a person has been less than truthful or
evasive in relating the required information.
The fact that many opportunities for such a violation exist is
illustrated by the central document required under SMCRA: the per-
mit application. Among other requirements, an applicant must submit
detailed information and disclosures including: (1) Whether the ap-
the Act. See 30 C.F.R. § 730. For this general discussion, it may therefore be assumed that most
state programs have provisions similar to SMCRA's. However, the specific coal mining laws and
regulations under which a particular mine operates should be consulted to gain a detailed understanding
of the criminal penalties which may be available under that program because those penalties may
differ from the federal SMCRA.
16. 30 U.S.C. § 1268(g) (Supp. 1990).
17. Id. § 1268(e).
18. Id. § 1268(g). See also id. § 1268(0. Any director, officer or agent of a corporate permittee
who willfully and knowingly authorized, ordered, or carried out a violation may be subject to the
same criminal penalties as may be imposed on a corporation.
19. 30 U.S.C. § 1268(g) (Supp. 1990).
[Vol. 93
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plicant, or any subsidiary, affiliate or persons "controlled by or under
common control with" the applicant, has had a federal or state coal
mining permit suspended or revoked within the prior five years, 20 (2)
a list of all violation notices received by the applicant during the prior
three years concerning any "provision of the Act, or of any law, rule
or regulation of the United States, or of any state law, rule or reg-
ulation enacted pursuant to federal law, rule or regulation pertaining
to air or water environmental protection, ' 21 and (3) a list of any
unabated cessation orders and unabated air and water quality vio-
lation notices received by the applicant and any coal mining operation
"owned or controlled by either the applicant or by any person who
owns or controls the applicant."'
As to protection of environmental resources, an applicant is re-
quired to submit: (1) a determination of the "probable hydrologic
consequences" of the proposed mining and reclamation operation,
both on and off the mine site,3 (2) a statement of the result of test
borings or core samplings from the permit area, including a chemical
analysis of potentially acid or toxic- forming sections of the over-
burden,24 (3) a "detailed description of the measures to be taken
during the mining and reclamation process to insure the protection
of (inter alia) ... surface and ground water systems, both on- and
off-site,'"'2 and (4) an estimate of the cost per acre of reclamation,
including a statement of how the permittee plans to comply with each
of the requirements set out in Section 515 of SMCRA (containing
the general environmental protection performance standards).6 In ad-
dition, requests for variances from any SMCRA requirements, in-
cluding the need for a permit, the obligation to restore land to its
approximate original contour, or the requirement that reclamation be
conducted "as contemporaneously as practicable with the surface coal
20. Id. § 1257(b)(5) (Supp. 1990).
21. 30 C.F.R. § 778.15(c) (1990).
22. 30 U.S.C. § 1257(b)(5) (Supp. 1990); 30 C.F.R. § 778.15(c) (1990).
23. 30 U.S.C. § 1257(b)(11) (Supp. 1990).
24. Id. § 1257(b)(15) (Supp. 1990).
25. Id. § 1259(a)(13) (Supp. 1990).
26. Id. § 1259(a)(5).
1991]
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mining operations," require further specific representations as to the
bases for any such request.27
Because both the permit application and other applications for
approval of certain practices are frequently viewed by the applicant
as documents of persuasion, a requirement that the applicant be com-
pletely forthright in discussing site analysis, and environmental prob-
lems which could result from the contemplated mining operations,
would seem unreasonable if strictly applied and literally interpreted.
This is especially so because SMCRA places on the applicant the
burden of establishing that all requirements of the regulatory scheme
can and will be met.28 Under this regimen, an applicant for a permit
or other approval must reveal all information regarding site conditions
which may make it difficult to adequately reclaim a permit area, and
then pray that the regulatory authority approves the plan for dealing
with these contingencies. Moreover, because of the enormous amount
of technical data which must be included in any permit application
(i.e., a description of how the permittee plans to comply with each
of the environmental protection performance standards), companies
required to obtain several permits - particularly for a specific ge-
ographic region - frequently assume that simply replicating much
of what was included in the first permit application for that area will
suffice as applications for additional permits or boundary revisions
are submitted. The assumption may be incorrect and, should damage
to the environment result from a failure to perform an adequate
investigation before submitting any application, a criminal investi-
gation could result. Such an investigation would involve careful scru-
tiny of application statements and disclosures in an effort to establish
that they were known to be false when made, or that willful igno-
rance, as a result of an inadequate or absent pre-application inves-
tigation, rises to the level of a "knowing" violation of the law.29
27. Id. § 1291(28)(A) (Supp. 1990) (exemption from permit requirement where coal removal is
incidental to extraction of other minerals for commercial sale where coal is less than 16 2/3% of
total tonnage of minerals removed); 30 U.S.C. § 1262 (Supp. 1990) (coal exploration approvals); 30
U.S.C. § 1265(c)- (e) (variance from approximate original contour restoration); 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(16)
(variance from contemporaneous reclamation of surface mined lands).
28. 30 U.S.C. § 1260(a) (Supp. 1990).
29. This would include the failure to make any statement which should be made, pursuant to
30 U.S.C. § 1268(g). Note that this raises significant questions as to the need for disclosure of the
results of "due diligence" investigations, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Depending on the federal or state programs which pertain to a
given operation, there are additional reporting and record keeping
obligations imposed by SMCRA. For example, data resulting from
groundwater monitoring, records of well logs and bore hole data,
and progress reports may be required.30 With regard to blasting op-
erations, an operator must maintain logs detailing the blast location,
the pattern and depth of drill holes, the amount of explosive used,
and the order and length of delay in the blast.3' The log must be
kept for a period of at least three years and must be available for
public inspection.12 A decision by a mine officer or employee to record
untruthful or incomplete information in any such report to avoid
memorializing a violation of the law, particularly if such a pattern
persists, could result in exposure to criminal liability for the permittee.
The same is true with respect to any false statement or misrep-
resentation in a report filed under the federal Abandoned Mine Rec-
lamation program.33 Particular areas of concern with regard to the
submission of statements and fees under the abandoned mine lands
program include computation of the proper weight of "coal pro-
duced" upon which the fee is calculated, and the fact that (in certain
situations) a person exercising control over another actually con-
ducting mining operations may be liable for payment of reclamation
fees on the coal producedY
2. Willful and Knowing Violations of a Permit
Section 518(e) of SMCRA states that:
Any person who willfully and knowingly violates a condition of a permit...
or fails or refuses to comply with any order issued under section 521 or section
30. 30 U.S.C. § 1267(b) (Supp. 1990).
31. Id. § 1265(b)(15)(B).
32. 30 C.F.R. 816.68 (1990).
33. 30 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (Supp. 1990). On August 21, 1990 the first person indicted for de-
frauding the Abandoned Mine Land Fund was sentenced to three years' probation and ordered to
pay nearly $10,000 to the federal government. Robert Heifer, a partner in R & H Surface Mining
of Sholacta, Pennsylvania pleaded guilty to charges of falsifying coal production reports submitted
to the Interior Department. As a convicted felon, Heifer will no longer be able to obtain mining
permits. Mine Regulation Reporter, July 6, 1990; id., August 31, 1990.
34. See United States v. Rapoca Energy Co., 613 F. Supp. 1161 (W.D. Va. 1985).
1991]
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526 of this Act or any order incorporated in a final decision issued by the Secretary
under this Act... shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than
$10,000, or by imprisonment for not more than one year or both."
In this regard, a broad requirement attaching to each permit issued
under SMCRA is that the mining operation meet "all applicable per-
formance standards ... and such other requirements as the regu-
latory authority shall promulgate." 36 Among such standards are
requirements that an operator: (1) remove top soil in a separate layer
and segregate it from other spoil, (2) maintain a vegetative cover as
necessary to avoid deterioration, 37 (3) "insure that all debris, acid-
forming materials, (and) toxic materias... are treated or buried and
compacted or otherwise disposed of in a manner designed to prevent
contamination of ground or surface waters ... ,,,38 (4) not deposit
spoil material or waste outside the permit area,39 and (5) "to the
extent possible using the best technology currently available, minimize
disturbances and adverse impacts of the operation on fish, wildlife,
and related environmental values .... ,,o
An operator intentionally violating any of these requirements, such
as failing to have operating guidelines requiring the separation and
maintenance of top soil, allowing the haphazard replacement of spoil
material in mining pits without identifying and isolating (and treating
where required) potentially toxic material, or by placing excess spoil
material in a manner or in an area which has not been approved by
the regulatory authority, could face a criminal investigation, partic-
ularly if long-term-environmental harm results. This is also true in
the event of failure to meet additional, site- specific conditions of a
mining permit.
3. Willful and Knowing Violations of Orders
Section 518(e) of SMCRA authorizes the imposition of criminal
penalties for willful and knowing violations of any order issued by
35. 30 U.S.C. § 1268(e) (Supp. 1990).
36. Id. § 1265(a).
37. Id. § 1265(b)(5).
38. Id. § 1265(b)(14).
39. Id. § 1265(b)(11), (22).
40. Id. § 1265 (b)(24).
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the Secretary (or corresponding official under a state program), except
for orders involving civil penalties. If employed expansively, this sanc-
tion would apply to a violation of orders or rulings issued under the
name of the Secretary concerning approval of specific practices or
variances from general requirements at a particular operation. Ob-
viously, an operator would be at peril in knowingly undertaking prac-
tices which have not been approved, or specifically disapproved, while
anticipating later receipt of such approval or a successful attempt to
modify or overturn an adverse order.
In addition, section 704 of SMCRA states that:
Any person who shall, except as permitted by law, willfully resist, prevent,
impede, or interfere with the Secretary or any of his agents in the performance of
duties pursuant to this Act shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000
or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.4 '
Under this provision, refusal to grant access to the mine site to
a duly authorized regulatory official or refusal to permit a review of
records and reports required to be maintained under SMCRA could
result in criminal charges. Indeed, virtually any effort to prevent an
official from discovering and evaluating a violation or possible harm
to the environment caused by an operation could be prosecuted under
this section.
While the criminal penalty provisions of SMCRA have rarely been
used in the fourteen years since adoption of the Act, it seems clear
that criminal sanctions will be employed more frequently in the fu-
ture. All persons working at mining and related permitted operations,
management and hourly personnel alike, should be made aware of
this potential liability. In short, coal operators must not view the
reluctance of prosecutors to bring criminal charges during the for-
mative years of the SMCRA regulatory scheme as an indicator that
such liability is unlikely in the future.
III. C mnmNAL SANCTIoNs UNDER GENERAL ENvIRONMENTAL LAWS
While SMCRA established the environmental regulatory scheme
most readily associated with the coal industry, state and federal re-
41. Id. § 1294 (Supp. 1990).
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gulators have an additional array of penalty mechanisms available to
them under other environmental laws. A multitude of federal and state
environmental protection laws give regulators the ability to deal with
coal operator violations in a comprehensive manner, including related
activities such as transportation, processing, transloading, by-product
and sales operations. Virtually all major federal environmental statutes
which pertain to such operations provide both federal and state reg-
ulatory agencies with various penalties with which to deter polluters
and correspondingly enforce compliance. These statutes generally en-
able state and federal agencies to modify or revoke permits, issue
compliance orders, seek injunctive relief, or compel clean- up of en-
vironmental contamination while still providing an impressive variety
of civil penalties which may be assessed. In addition, most major
environmental statutes pertaining to coal and related operations also
contain stringent criminal sanctions. Indeed, the presence of both civil
and criminal sanctions within individual environmental statutes may,
at times, lead to parallel divil and criminal actions for the same alleged
violation.42
Over the past two decades, Congress has consistently and contin-
uously expanded individual response to criminal liability under the
various health, safety, and environmental statutes. Within the area of
food and drugs, for instance, a strict liability standard has been es-
tablished for violations which involve adulterated or mislabeled prod-
ucts. Nevertheless, Congress has not yet seen fit to introduce strict
or even vicarious liability within environmental protection statutes.
These statutes generally contain a scienter requirement, expressly cover
more classes of individuals, and allow for substantially increased pen-
alties for violations. Criminal prosecution in the area of environmental
regulation is clearly intended to foreshadow a metamorphosis of what
is viewed by regulators as a noncompliance culture within industry.
It is generally recognized that the primary objective of criminal pro-
visions, their very presence within the environmental protection laws,'
42. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970). See id. at 11-12. The United States Supreme
Court held, as a general matter, that evidence obtained through civil discovery may be introduced
in criminal actions. An exception to this rule is where the "Government has brought a civil action
solely to obtain evidence for its criminal prosecution or has failed to advise the defendant in its civil
proceeding that it contemplates his criminal prosecution ......
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is to provide a deterrence to violation and an incentive for voluntary
compliance with the parallel civil provisions. Thus, in the end, these
penalties are all designed to punctuate the economic unattractiveness
of noncompliance.
Possibly the most notable change within criminal enforcement of
environmental compliance lies within the very nature of the criminal
penalties themselves. Beyond application of criminal penalties for the
knowing or negligent violation of substantive provisions of the various
acts, several of these statutes introduce criminal penalties for the fail-
ure to immediately notify government agencies of the discharge or
release of certain pollutants or hazardous substances. Similarly, strin-
gent prohibitions against false statements provide bases upon which
acts involving knowing misstatements within required reports or mon-
itor tampering may be prosecuted. Possibly most striking of all has
been the advent and dramatic increase of criminal convictions for
crimes of "knowing endangerment." Here, a criminal conviction can
be sustained even in the absence of actual injury. All that need be
proved is that the defendant knowingly created an imminent risk of
death or serious bodily injury to persons.
Under modern environmental compliance enforcement, individuals
stand naked in the face of criminal prosecution: void of corporate
insulation and protection and very much accountable for the conse-
quences of their actions. The following subsections contain an abridge-
ment of the elements of criminal offenses under five major federal
environmental statutes potentially affecting a broad spectrum of coal
industry activity, along with a description of the corresponding en-
forcement penalties.
A. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act43
RCRA states that any person who knowingly transports, treats,
stores, or disposes of hazardous waste without a permit 44 or in know-
ing violation of a permit, or who omits material information, makes
43. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (hereinafter "RCRA").
44. One is deemed to have a RCRA permit for activities covered by SMCRA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 6925(0.
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any false material statement, conceals, destroys, or alters any record
or report mandated by RCRA may be fined up to $50,000 per day
of violation or be subject to imprisonment for up to five years, or
both. A second violation of RCRA may result in a fine or impris-
onment of up to double the maximum penalty appropriate for the
first violation or both. Under RCRA section 6928(d)(6), anyone who
knowingly exports hazardous waste without the consent of the re-
ceiving country, or in violation of any international agreement be-
tween the United States and the receiving country, may be fined up
to $50,000 per day, imprisoned for up to two years, or both. Under
section 6928(e) of RCRA, any person convicted of knowingly trans-
porting, treating, storing, disposing, or exporting hazardous waste,
which thereby places another person in imminent danger of serious
bodily injury or death may, upon conviction, be fined up to $250,000,
imprisoned for up to fifteen years, or both. (Corporate violators
may be fined up to $1,000,000 for such a violation.).
B. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act 45
Under CERCLA, any person in charge of a vessel or facility
from which a hazardous substance in equal to or greater than a
reportable quantity is released and who fails to notify the National
Response Center of such release may be fined up to $10,000 or
imprisoned for up to three years (up to five years for a second or
subsequent violation), or both. Moreover, any facility owner, op-
erator, or transporter of hazardous substances to a facility who
knowingly falls to notify the EPA of the existence of such a facility,
the amount and type of hazardous substances to be found there,
and any known, suspected, or likely releases from such a facility,
may be fined up to $10,000 or imprisoned for up to one year.41
Under CERCLA section 9603(d)(2), any person who knowingly de-
stroys, mutilates, erases, conceals, falsifies, or otherwise renders
unavailable any records with respect to hazardous substances at a
45. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (hereinafter "CERCLA").
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c).
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facility may be fined up to $20,000 or imprisoned for up to three
years (up to five years for second or subsequent violations).
C. Clean Air Act
Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, P.L.101-549,
felony-level penalties have recently been introduced for criminal con-
duct actionable under the Clean Air Act of 1977. 47 The knowing
and willful violation of any rule, order, waiver, or permit prom-
ulgated or approved (including any requirement for the payment of
any fee owed to the federal government under requirements re-
garding state implementation plans), orders to comply with state
implementation plans or standards, requirements for ozone protec-
tion, new source performance, hazardous emissions, inspections,
preconstruction requirements, or provisions regarding permits and
acid-deposition control is punishable by imprisonment for up to five
years or fines of up to $250,000 (for individuals) or $500,000 (for
organizations), or both. The amendments generally expand prison
terms from one year (under the prior law) to up to five years for
first offenses, while, at the same time, substantially increasing the
amounts of fines that may attach. Furthermore, the amendments
authorize the doubling of penalties for repeat offenders for all cat-
egories of conduct considered criminal under the Act.48
Under section 113(c)5 of the amended Act, the knowing release
of hazardous or extremely hazardous air pollutants or substances
which cause imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to
persons is punishable by imprisonment of up to fifteen years and
a fine of up to $1,000,000 for violators who are organizations. Under
section 113(c)4 of the amended Act, negligent releases are punishable
by fines of up to $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for cor-
porations, or imprisonment of up to one year, or both. Under sec-
tion 113(c)3 of the amended Act, violations of any key requirement
of the Act are punishable by fines of up to $250,000 for individuals,
and $500,000 for corporations, or may result in imprisonment for
not more than one year, or both.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 7401.
48. Clean Air Act § 113(c), as amended.
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D. Clean Water Act
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 49 commonly re-
ferred to as the Clean Water Act, any person who negligently vi-
olates the provisions of the Act or negligently discharges into a sewer
system or publicly owned treatment system (POTW) any pollutant
which such person knew or reasonably should have known could
cause personal injury or property damage, and which causes such
POTW to violate any effluent limitation or permit condition, may
be fined not less than $2,500 per day, nor more than $25,000 per
day per violation, or imprisoned for up to one year, or both. (Second
or subsequent violations may result in a doubling of fines and prison
terms.) Under section 19(c)(2) of the Act, any person who knowingly
violates the provisions of the Act or knowingly introduces into a
sewer system or POTW a pollutant under the terms as described in
section 1319(c)(1) may be fined not less than $5,000, nor more than
$50,000 per day of violation, or imprisoned for up to three years,
or both. (Likewise, second or subsequent violations may result in
a doubling of fines and prison terms.).
A violation of any provision of the Clean Water Act, coupled
with knowingly placing another person in imminent danger of death
or serious bodily injury may subject the violator to a penalty of up
to $250,000, imprisonment of up to fifteen years, or both. In ad-
dition, corporations may be fined up to $1,000,000, if convicted of
such a violation.
Knowingly making false statements or representations in docu-
ments or reports required under the Clean Water Act, or tampering
with monitoring equipment, may result in fines of up to $10,000 or
imprisonment of up to two years, or both.50 Moreover, the failure
of any person in charge of a vessel or on-shore facility to report
any discharge of oil or other hazardous substance from such vessel
or facility can result in fines up to $10,000 or imprisonment for up
to one year, or both.51
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (commonly referred to as the "Clean Water Act").
50. Section 1319(c)(4).
51. Section 1321(b)(5).
[Vol. 93
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/4
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW LIABILITY
E. Toxic Substances Control Act
Under the Toxic Substances Control Act 52 any person who know-
ingly or willfully violates the provisions of the Act may, upon con-
viction, be subject to a fine of up to $25,000 per day of violation
or one year imprisonment, or both.
F. Other Significant Non-Environmental Criminal Statutes
In addition to the criminal provisions and penalties contained in
these environmental statutes, federal environmental enforcement au-
thorities may also apply general criminal statutes and sanctions to
violators of environmental law. Thus, certain actions on the part
of alleged violators may cause enforcement authorities to initiate
actions under the various nonenvironmental law criminal provisions
in conjunction with the specific provisions provided for within the
environmental statutes themselves.
Federal law, under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982), establishes criminal
penalties which may be sought by federal prosecutors for a broad
range of false statements and representations made to government
agencies in addition to similar penalties provided for in the envi-
ronmental statute allegedly violated. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, crim-
inal penalties may attach for the communication of false statements
to government agencies above and beyond that which would oth-
erwise attach for submitting false reports under any of the envi-
ronmental statutes. Under section 1001, anyone who knowingly and
willfully makes a false statement to the federal government may be
fined up to $10,000 or imprisoned for up to five years.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1343, use of the mails, airways,
or interstate wires in connection with a "scheme or artifice" to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent representations may result in a fine of up to $10,000 or
imprisonment of up to five years.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1503, the Federal Obstruction of Justice Pro-
vision, there are provisions for fines of up to $5,000 or imprisonment
52. 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (hereinafter "TSCA").
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of up to five years for the intimidation of witnesses or the obstruc-
tion of the administration of justice by corrupt or threatening con-
duct or communications. This statute may very well come into play
in situations of employer/employee conflict of interest within crim-
inal enforcement actions (for example, when employees act as gov-
ernment "informants").
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. establishes a fine of up to $10,000 or
imprisonment of up to five years for conduct which involves know-
ingly and willfully conspiring to defraud, or otherwise circumventing
federal agency regulations. (However, it should be noted that section
361 of 18 U.S.C. may only be employed if two or more corporate
employees conspire to violate an environmental statute.).
Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
section 901(a), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982), it is illegal to acquire,
maintain, or control any enterprise through a "pattern" of rack-
eteering activities.53 However, in order to establish a "pattern" of
racketeering activity, and thus to be criminally convicted under RICO,
the prosecution must establish that at least two acts of racketeering
activity occurred, with the last such act having occurred within ten
years of the most recent.
Federal enforcement authorities have placed a substantial em-
phasis on the prosecution of criminal provisions and sanctions pro-
vided for in the various major federal environmental, as well as
nonenvironmental, statutes. Indeed, the criminal provisions con-
tained within the environmental statutes alone are formidable weap-
ons with which federal prosecutors may not only deter violations
and enforce compliance, but hold accountable individuals and cor-
porations responsible for past damage to the environment.
IV. WHO Is AT RISK? THE "KNOWING" VIOLATION
As noted earlier, Congress has not employed strict or vicarious
liability standards within the criminal provisions of environmental
protection statutes. A "scienter" requirement is found in each of
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
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the major environmental laws detailed. Because of the recent em-
phasis on the use of criminal sanctions, the courts are presently
grappling with the issues of what constitutes a "knowing" violation
and what levels of the corporate hierarchy (mine site to executive
suite) are at risk of sanctions. Currently, discerning a standard for
"knowing" under most environmental statutes represents the un-
ravelling of "a riddle wrapped in puzzles, surrounded by enigma."5 4
By reviewing the origin of the "knowing" requirement, one gains
a better understanding of its purpose and function. Historically, a
culpable state of mind has been a universal component of criminal
conduct. 55 Mental culpability serves so central a role in criminal law
that courts, reluctant to impose penal sanctions absent some form
of scienter, usually read such an element into statutes found lacking
in this respect. 56
A. Welfare Statutes - An Historical Perspective
As reflected earlier, modern environmental laws employ "know-
ing" as the standard for determining when actions constitute cul-
pable violations.57 Placing environmental protection laws in the
broader context of "public welfare" statutes serves as a helpful first
step in developing an analytical framework. Such classification causes
courts to apply a different, and in some ways more complex, series
of reasoning criteria from those used with regard to the mens rea
of crimes deriving from common law.
54. Paraphrasing the late Winston Churchill.
55. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 253-54 (1952); United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1977).
56. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 253-54; United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 437; see also Web-
her, Element Analysis Applied to Environmental Crimes: What Did They Know and When Did They
Know It?, 16 B.C. ENVTL. ArF. L. REv. 53, 55 (1988-89).
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is
no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law
as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal
individual to choose between good and evil. A relation between some mental element and
punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory
"But I didn't mean to," and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished
substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the
motivation for public prosecution.
Morrissette, 243 U.S. at 250-51.
57. Riesel, Criminal Prosecution of Environmental Crimes, Toxics L. RP. (BNA) 1025, 1067-
70 (Feb. 18, 1987); Webber, supra note 55.
1991]
21
Fluharty and Lannan: Criminal Liability for Environmental Law Violations by Coal Opera
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
"Public welfare" statutes emerged largely in response to the so-
cial needs produced by the industrial revolution." As populations
shifted from rural farms into congested urbanized settings, Congress
and state legislatures sought to protect the public fromthe dangers
inherent in such change. 59 These protective measures took the form
of regulations creating new duties or imposing new standards of care
on those in control of industry or engaging in activities affecting
the public health, safety, and welfare. 60 Where lawmakers felt that
civil fines would not provide a sufficient deterrent to the undesired
activity, criminal sanctions were imposed to make such regulations
more effective. 61
Many of these new criminal offenses required no mens rea or
mental culpability. 62 Instead, violation often entailed no more than
a breach of duty of care or failure to perform a newly imposed
duty.6 The imposition of strict liability on defendants accused of
"public welfare offenses" forced courts faced with adjudication un-
der the new laws to develop a rationale which addressed the due
process concerns stemming from lack of an intent element. 64 One
of the first opinions to address such concerns adopted the view that
the state may, on public policy grounds, create new offenses which
impose strict liability regardless of the actor's ignorance or good
faith. 65 In reaching that result, courts placed emphasis on the util-
itarian nature of such statutes, deferring to the lawmakers' decision
that the good to be obtained by protecting society exceeded any
possible injustice done to individuals."
58. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 253-54; see also Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM.
L. REv. 55 (1933).
59. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 254.
60. Morssette, 342 U.S. at 254.
61. See Dotterwech, 320 U.S. at 280-81; Morissette, 342 U.S. at 254-55.
62. See id. at 254-55.
63. Id. at 255.
64. See Shevl-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 69-70 (1910); United States v. Balint,
258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
65. Balint, 258 U.S. at 252. Although the cases make clear that Congress and state legislatures
can enact strict liability statutes, the constitutional limits in this area remain ill- defined. See also
United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922) (decided the same day as Balint); Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959).
66. See id., at 254; see also Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L REv. 55 (1933).
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In United States v. Balint,67 the United States Supreme Court
employed similar reasoning to sustain a conviction for narcotics pos-
session under the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act of 1914.6 The statute
lacked any provision making knowledge an element of the offense. 69
In addressing the due process concerns of the defendant, the Court
contrasted regulatory measuresenacted for social betterment to those
offenses deemed mala in se where the goal was punishnent.7 View-
ing the issue as one of statutory construction based upon inferences
as to Congressional intent, the Court announced that the tendency
to imply a culpability requirement into codified common-law crimes
should be modified when such a requirement would "obstruct" a
statute's purpose. 71 Later courts were to seize upon the weakness
inherent in the distinction Balint had drawn between common law
offenses which required intent and those strict liability offenses un-
der "welfare statutes.''72 "Obstruction of the statutory purpose" did
not provide much justification for abandonment of the traditional
intent requirement, since every statute is "obstructed" by an intent
requirement.7 3
Not until the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Dot-
terweich,74 was a more helpful rationale forthcoming. In Dotter-
weich, the Court upheld a conviction under a food and drug statute
which required no conscious wrongdoing on the part of the defen-
dant. 75 The Court's opinion focused on the nature of the offense76
and the purpose of the legislation, stating that the Act placed a
67. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
68. Id. at 252-54.
69. Id. at 251.
70. Id. at 252.
71. Id.
72. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 259:
Of course, the purpose of every statute would be "obstructed" by requiring a finding of
intent, if we assume that it had a purpose to convict without it. Therefore, the obstruction
rationale does not help us to learn the purpose of the omission by Congress.
73. See id.
74. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
75. See id. at 280-81:
The prosecution... is based on a now familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve
as effective means of regulation. Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement
for criminal conduct - awareness of some wrongdoing.
76. Id. (i.e., shipping adulterated and misbranded drugs).
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burden upon those persons in a responsible relation to the public
danger.7
Balint and Dotterweich dealt with federal food and drug regu-
lations which imposed strict criminal liability78 with regard to all
elements of the given offense. New issues arose in connection with
regulations which could be construed as requiring strict liability only
with regard to some of the. elements. The Supreme Court addressed
these issues in the case of United States v. Freed. 79 The defendant
in Freed had been indicted for possessing unregistered hand grenades
in violation of the National Fire Arms Act.80 To sustain a conviction
under that Act, the government carried the burden of proof on three
material elements: (1) that the defendants possessed certain items,
(2) that the items possessed were grenades, and (3) that the grenades
were not registered.81 The Court held that the statute required the
prosecution to prove knowing possession of the items as well as
knowledge that the items possessed were grenades.8 2 No culpable
intent was necessary in regard to the unregistered status of the gre-
nades.83
The import of Freed lies in the distinction drawn between the
first two elements of the offense and the third element. Proving
intent with regard to the third element would require the Govern-
ment to show that the defendants possessed some knowledge of the
relevant law. "The concurrence in Freed articulated that although
such an intent requirement would involve a legal element - whether
77. See id. at 281.
78. See Batey, Strict Construction of Firearms Offenses: The Supreme Court and the Gun
Control Act 1968, 49 LAW & CoNrmip. PRoBS. 163, 176 & nn.114, 116 (1986).
Strict liability is the general rule with respect to pure food and drug laws:
[t]he distribution of impure or adulterated food for consumption is an act perilous to human
life and health, hence, a dangerous act, and cannot be made innocent and harmless by the
want of knowledge or by the good faith of the seller; it is the act itself, not the intent,
that determines the guilt, and the actual harm to the public is the same in one case as in
the other.
79. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 614-15 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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the grenades were registered in accord with federal law, such a re-
quirement would not involve "consciousness of wrongdoing" in the
sense of knowledge that one's actions were prohibited or illegal.85
"The knowledge involved is solely knowledge of the circumstances
that the law has defined as material to the defense. 8 6 This type of
knowledge, reasoned the Court, arose from the injurious nature of
the grenades involved. "[T]he likelihood of governmental regulation
of the distribution of such weapons is so great that anyone must
be presumed to be aware of it. ' 87
The analysis embodied in Freed provided the foundation for fu-
ture judicial interpretation of "welfare offenses" which entail some
form of culpability as a prerequisite to criminal conviction.88 Freed
also set precedent in that it was the first conviction under a "public
welfare statute" which imposed felony, rather than misdemeanor,
penalties. Expanding the category of public welfare offenses to en-
compass statutes that imposed felony penalties marked a departure
from past practice.89 Previous decisions under "public welfare sta-
tutes" dealt with misdemeanor penalties which were viewed as caus-
ing no grave damage to a defendant's reputation. 90 In contrast, some
commentators have noted that the infamous label of felony is "as
bad a word as you could give to man or thing. ' 91
B. Advent of Environmental Protection Statutes
The environmental debacles of the late 60's and early 70's en-
gendered a growing public concern which found expression in the
85. Id.
86. Id. The Model Penal Code illustrates the distinction:
It should be noted that the general principle that ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse
is usually greatly overstated; it has no application when the circumstances made material
by the definition of the offense include a legal element.
Model Penal Code § 2.02 comment 131 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
87. See Freed, 401 U.S. at 616.
88. See Weber, supra note 55, at 57.
89. See, e.g., Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277; Morissette, 342 U.S. 246.
90. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256.
91. Id. at 260 (citation omitted):
Stealing, larceny, and its variants and equivalents ... existed before legislation; they are
invasions of rights of property which stir a sense of insecurity in the whole community and
arouse public demand for retribution, the penalty is high and, when a sufficient amount
is involved, the infamy is that of a felony, which, says Maitland, is ... as bad a word
as you can give to man or thing.
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passage of many federal and state measures designed to protect the
environment. Most of these new laws contrasted with earlier public
welfare statutes, such as those relating to food and drugs, in that
they required some measure of culpability before a penal sanction
could be imposed. 92 As originally enacted, most, if not all, envi-
ronmental statutes presented the threat of a misdemeanor convic-
tion.93 However, growing public awareness and concern in this area,
accompanied by fears that misdemeanor convictions were being
viewed merely as a cost of doing business, resulted in amendments
which elevated violations of certain environmental protection sta-
tutes to felonies. 94
While these statutes reflected public health and safety concerns
similar to those which initiated earlier public welfare statutes, due
process considerations and the fear of punishing innocent conduct
prompted legislators to reject the strict liability standard. 95 As a re-
sult, most environmental protection statutes included a class of of-
fenses that imposed criminal penalties only when conduct was
"knowing." 96 Courts adjudicating offenses under such statutes were
faced with the task of integrating the "knowing" requirement, and
the due process concerns which it reflects, with the public welfare
nature of offenses under the environmental protection statutes.
The Supreme Court considered these competing concerns in the
case of United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp.97
In International Minerals, a shipper was charged with violating a
Department of Transportation Regulation which required that the
classification of certain hazardous materials appear on the shipping
papers for such materials. 9 Title 18 U.S.C. § 834(a) empowers the
92. Reisel, supra note 56, at 1067. Detailed in Section III of this Article, these environmental
protection statutes included the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (1982)
("knowingly or willfully"); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (1982) ("knowingly"); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6928
(d)-(e) (1982 & F. Supp. III 1985) ("knowingly"); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(I)-(2)
(1982) ("knowingly").
93. See sources cited supra note 91.
94. See, e.g., RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d).
95. See S. Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1980).
96. See Weber, supra note 55, at 61.
97. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
98. Id. at 559.
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Department of Transportation to formulate regulations for the safe
transportation of corrosive liquids and other dangerous articles and
to impose criminal sanctions upon individuals who 'knowingly vi-
olate any such regulations.'" Citing Freed, the Court held that the
statute required knowledge of the shipment of dangerous materials,
but not "knowledge" of the particular regulation.'00 The Court stated
that it could "see no reason why the word 'regulations' should not
be construed as a short-hand designation for specific acts or om-
issions which violate the Act."101 Oddly enough, in 1960 the Senate
had approved an amendment which would have deleted "know-
ingly" and substituted in its place 'being aware that the Interstate
Commerce Commission had formulated regulations for the safe
transportation of explosives or other dangerous articles.'102 The House
refused to agree to the later amendment, favoring retention of 'the
present law by providing that a person must 'knowingly' violate the
regulations.' 0 3 Despite this legislative history, the Court analogized
to the principles in the Freed decision to distinguish between "know-
ing" in connection with possession and "knowingly" with regard
to violation of the regulation. 1°4 In doing so, the Court reiterated
the presumption that, based upon the nature of the material in-
volved, anyone consciously possessing such materials or dealing with
them must be aware of the regulation.0 5 The Court had, in effect,
read the regulation as containing the proposed amendments which
Congress rejected in 1960.
Since International Minerals, the Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed similar issues under environmental protection statutes. In-
terim lower court decisions vary in result, because of a failure to
faithfully follow or adequately pursue the International Minerals
analysis.10 These variations also derive from the fact that some of
99. Id.
100. Id. at 560, 563.
101. Id. at 562.
102. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1975, 86th Cong, 2d Sess. 10-11 (1960)).
103. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1975, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960)).
104. Id. at 560, 565; see Freed, 401 U.S. at 609 (holding the Federal Firearms Control Act to
be a regulatory measure in the interest of the public safety, which may well be premised on the theory
that one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act).
105. International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 565.
106. Weber, supra note 55, at 65.
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the lower courts addressed offenses under different statutes with
different legislative history.0
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.18 is one such decision.
In Johnson & Towers, the Third Circuit addressed the "knowing"
requirement as it pertains to a conviction under the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA).109 In Johnson & Towers, two
employees of a chemical plant were indicted for allegedly violating
RCRA section 6928(d)(2)(A) which prohibited "knowing" disposal
of hazardous waste without a permit. 10 After determining that the
later section applied to employees as well as owners and operators,"'
the Court proceeded to address the "knowing" requirement. In
making its analysis, the Court looked to the language of the statute
and then to the Act's legislative history.12 Rejecting government
arguments limiting "knowingly" as used in the statute to modify
only "treats, stores, or disposes" as overly literal,"3 the Court con-
cluded that "knowingly" also applied to the permit requirement
107. Id.
108. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1208 (1985).
109. Id. at 664.
RCRA's criminal provision applies to:
"[a]ny person who -
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed under
this subchapter either -
(A) without having obtained a permit under section 6925 of this title ... or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such permit."
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d).
110. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664.
111. Id. at 664-65 (the counts under RCRA charged that the defendants "did knowingly treat,
store, and dispose of, and did cause to be treated, stored and disposed of hazardous wastes without
having obtained a permit ... in that the defendants discharged, deposited, injected, dumped, spilled,
leaking and placed degreasers ... into the trench .... " The indictment alleged that both Angel and
Hopkins "managed, supervised and directed a substantial portion of Johnson & Towers' operations
... including those related to the treatment, storage and disposal of the hazardous waste and pol-
lutants" and that the chemicals were discharged by "the defendants and others at their direction."
Johnson & Towers pled guilty to the RCRA counts. Hopkins and Angel pled not guilty.
The Court held that section 6928(d)(2)(A) cover employees as well as owners and operators of
the facility who knowingly treat, store, or dispose of any hazardous waste, but the employees can
be subject to criminal prosecution only if they knew or should have known that there had been no
compliance with the permit requirement of section 6925.
112. Id. at 665.
113. Id. at 667-68.
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stated in RCRA section 6928(d)(2)(A).1 4 To convict the employees
under that section the government would have to prove that each
defendant knew that Johnson & Towers was required to have a
permit, and that each defendant knew that Johnson & Towers did
not have a permit. 15 The Court qualified its holding by stating that
a jury could be instructed that such knowledge may be inferred.1 16
C. Redefining "Public Welfare Statute"
In 1985, the Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity
to further develop its notions regarding the degree of culpability
required under the criminal provisions of public welfare statutes.117
The issue presented itself in the case of Liparota v. United States,,"
an action in which the Federal Government sought conviction of a
restaurant owner under 7 U.S.C.S. § 2024(b). This section provides
that "whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or pos-
sesses coupons or other authorization cards in any manner not au-
thorized by [the statute] or the regulations" is subject to fine and
imprisonment. 1 9 Even though Liparota did not involve environ-
mental statutes or regulations, the Court's approach to distinguish-
ing the food stamp regulations at issue from other public welfare
statutes served to refine that concept along with the corresponding
culpability requirement. 20
The Liparota opinion found the expression by Congress of the
mental state required for conviction under the statute to be ambig-
uous and of little guidance. 21 Nothing in the legislative history clar-
ified the Congressional purpose on the issue.' 22 Consequently, the
Court resorted to the broad legal maxims which place criminal of-
fenses requiring no mens rea in a "generally disfavored status" and
114. Id. at 668-69.
115. Id. at 667.
116. Id. at 670.
117. See Weber, supra note 55, at 72.
118. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
119. 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1988).
120. See Weber, supra note 55, at 72.
121. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424.
122. Id. at 424-25.
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favored resolving ambiguous criminal statutes in a manner which
provides fair warning concerning conduct rendered illegal. 23 Without
rejecting the holding in Johnson & Towers that "regulatory statutes
... are to be construed to effectuate the regulatory purpose," 124
the Liparota opinion emphasized that the purposes behind the food
stamp act were not compelling enough to justify dropping all cul-
pability requirements. 125 The Court stated that:
the offense at issue here differs substantially from those public welfare offenses
we have previously recognized. In most previous instances, Congress has rendered
criminal a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to
stringent public regulation and may seriously threaten the communities health or
safety."
In the absence of such health and safety considerations and lack-
ing a clearer expression of Congressional intent, the Court found
no basis for controverting the traditional mens rea requirement. 127
In articulating the two part test for determining whether a given
statute qualifies as a "public welfare statute," the Court made ex-
plicit the importance which the nature of the activity has on that
determination.128
123. Id. at 426-27:
Requiring mens rea is in keeping with our longstanding recognition of the principle that
"ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity."
Rewis v. Uited States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971). See also United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-348 (1971);
Bell v. United States, 349 US 81, 83 (1955); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.,
334 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952). Application of the rule of lenity ensures that criminal statutes
will provide fair warning concerning conduct rendered illegal and strikes the appropriate
balance between the legislature, the prosecutor, and the court in defining criminal liabil-
ity.... Although the rule of lenity is not to be applied where to do so would conflict
with the implied or expressed intent of Congress, it provides a time-honored interpretive
guideline when the congressional purpose is unclear.
See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978) ("[c]ertainly far more
than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify
dispensing with an intent requirement.").
124. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 666. See also United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-
73 (1975); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959); Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280-81; Balint,
258 U.S. at 251-52; United States v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
125. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426-27, 432-33. ("A food stamp can hardly be compared to a hand
grenade .... nor can the unauthorized acquisition or possession of food stamps be compared to the
selling of adulterated drugs, as in Dotterweich.").
126. Id. at 4.
127. Id. at 425-26; see also Weber, supra note 55, at 72.
128. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 432-34.
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D. Current Status of the "Knowing" Requirement
One year after the Supreme Court decision in Liparota, the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the extent to which knowl-
edge of regulations should be required before imposition of criminal
penalties under RCRA section 6928(d)(1). 129 In United States v.
Hayes, 0 an employee of Hayes, an airplane refurbishing plant which
produced waste in the form of solvents mixed with paint, had ne-
gotiated a deal with an employee of Performance Advantage, Inc.
to dispose of these wastes at no charge. 3 Under the oral agreement,
Performance Advantage would obtain from Hayes the jet fuel drained
from the planes for twenty cents per gallon, and, at no charge,
would remove the other waste from the Hayes plant. 132 The Gov-
ernment began its action when approximately six hundred drums of
waste were found deposited among seven illegal disposal sites in
Georgia and Alabama. 33 The waste in the drums was determined
to be the paint and solvent which Performance Advantage had re-
moved from the Hayes facility. 3 4
For purposes of analysis, the Hayes opinion broke the statute
into two separate questions: (1) whether knowledge of the regula-
tions was required and (2) whether knowledge of the permit status
was required? The Court began by noting that RCRA falls within
the category of "public welfare statutes.' 1 35 Classifying RCRA in
such a manner affected the Court's analysis of the culpability re-
quirement.1 36 Based upon a lack of Congressional guidance, either
in the statute or in the legislative history, the Court proceeded to
129. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) provides criminal sanctions for "[a]ny person who... (1) knowingly
transports any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter to a facility which does not
have a permit under section 6925 of this title." 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)(1) (Supp. 1985). The current
version of the statute applies to anyone who "transports or causes to be transported. Id.
130. 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
131. Id. at 1500-01.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1501.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1503. (in addition, section 6928(d)(1) is undeniably a public welfare statute, involving
a heavily regulated area with great ramification for the public health and safety).
136. Id. (it is completely fair and reasonable to charge those who choose to operate in such
areas with knowledge of the regulatory provisions).
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analyze the requirement under general legal principles. 1'" Reasoning
that because the public policy behind such a statute is so compelling
the Court deemed the defendant presumptively aware of RCRA's
regulations.13 8
The presumption disposed of the first issue. Next, the Hayes
Court considered how far along the sentence the "knowing" re-
quirement should travel. 3 9 In analyzing this issue, the Court placed
emphasis on the Congressional purpose of combating the transpor-
tation of hazardous waste to unlicensed facilities in enacting RCRA. 40
Expressing concern over the criminalization of innocent conduct, the
Court held that the government must prove that a given defendant
acted with knowledge of the permit status of the facility. 141 The
Court attempted to mitigate the holding by stating that "knowledge
does not require certainty; a defendant acts knowingly if he is aware
'that that result is practically certain to follow from his conduct,
whatever his desire may be as to that result." 1 42
V. CONCLUSION
The maturing of regulatory and technical schemes under the na-
tion's central environmental protection laws, including RCRA, sig-
nals a new emphasis on compliance enforcement, particularly through
the use of the deterrent effects of criminal sanctions. Public concern
for the environment, coupled with many recent successes in the pros-
ecution of polluters, will encourage an increasing resort to criminal
sanctions for noncompliance.
Because of the disturbance of land and other natural resources
necessarily associated with the recovery, processing and transpor-
137. Id. at 1502.
138. Id. at 1502-03.
139. Id. at 1503.
140. Id. at 1504.
141. Id. (the precise wrong Congress intended to combat through section 6928(d) was trans-
portation to an unlicensed facility. Removing the knowing requirement from this element would crim-
inalize innocent conduct; for example, if the defendant reasonably believed that the site had a permit,
but in fact had been misled by the people at the site).
142. Id. Jurors may also consider the circumstances and terms of the transaction. It is common
knowledge that properly disposing of wastes is an expensive task, and if someone is willing to take
away wastes at an unusual price or circumstances, then a juror can infer that the transporter knows
the wastes are not being taken to a permitted facility.
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tation of coal and coal by-products, those engaged in the industry
are among those most likely to be the object of increased investi-
gation and use of criminal sanctions to encourage future compliance.
Boom or bust cycles, and the accompanying effects on the ability
of marginal producers to maintain compliance, ensures that the in-
dustry as a whole, regardless of how conscientious management may
be or how advanced and institutionalized environmental compliance
programs may be, will remain under close and increasing scrutiny.
Judicial interpretations of the "knowing" standard contained in
most environmental statute criminal provisions have expanded the
range of individuals in industry beyond those traditionally thought
to be at risk. Presumptions that those involved in an industry subject
to strong environmental regulation have knowledge of the applicable
regulations and the critical nature of environmental disturbance pe-
culiar to the industry facilitate criminal prosecution. Viewing
"knowing" as the capacity to determine whether or not something
was known renders the headquarters executive as likely a target of
investigation and sanctions as the front line manager or hourly worker
handling regulated materials or executing the mining plan. Only by
encouraging attentiveness to compliance standards and regulatory
requirements, as well as institution-wide education of who is at risk
and why, can the likelihood of criminal sanctions be reduced or
eliminated. There can be no substitute for renewed and enhanced
use of compliance audits, in-house training programs, and efficient
communication of obligations and responsibilities to all levels of a
company's hierarchy in this rapidly expanding universe of environ-
mental liability.
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